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TAX TREATMENT OF EMPLOYMENT-RELATED





Section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that
"gross income does not include ... the amount of any damages
received (whether by suit or agreement...) on account of personal
injuries or sickness."' The applicability, if not the wisdom, of this
provision to physical injuries seems clear on its face, and its appli-
cability to non-physical personal injuries has long been settled as
well.
But in at least one specific area of some significance, the
proper role of Section 104(a)(2) has become increasingly problem-
atic. In recent years considerable litigation has centered on the ap-
plicability of Section 104(a)(2) to payments in settlement, or other
resolution, of employment-related disputes-i.e., disputes arising
out of an employment relationship and accompanied by charges of
tortious conduct leveled at one or more of the parties.2 Does the
recipient of such a financial settlement have tax-free income be-
cause of the tortious aura in which the deal is struck? Or does the
recipient have compensation income, or other taxable income,
given the employment relationship that gave rise to the dispute
and ultimately the payment? In Byrne v. Commissioner, the Tax
Court recently answered both of these questions in the affirmative.
Christine Byrne's employer fired her in 1980 when the em-
ployer was under investigation by the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission [EEOC] for possible sex-based wage disparities
in one of its departments. Although not employed in the depart-
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ceived on account of personal injury, whether the injury arises out of an employment rela-
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jecting punitive damages to tax is an appropriate limitation on the Section 104(a)(2)
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ment under investigation, Byrne had been singled out by company
officials as a person who may have informed the EEOC of the wage
disparity. After her termination, the EEOC filed suit against the
company, alleging inter alia that the firing impeded its investiga-
tion under the Fair Labor Standards Act and also violated Section
215(a)(3) of that Act by discriminating against employees who par-
ticipated in the investigation. The EEOC requested Byrne's rein-
statement as relief, but did not seek the award of any back pay.
The suit against the company was subsequently settled. As part of
the settlement, the company paid Byrne $20,000 in 1981 in lieu of
reinstatement; Byrne in turn signed a release under which she re-
leased any claims "with respect to any matter relating to or arising
out of the [EEOC] charges" and "any and all liability arising out of
[the suit filed by the EEOC, her employment by the company and
her] separation therefrom."'4 Byrne did not include any of the
$20,000 as income on her 1981 tax return. The Internal Revenue
Service took the position that the entire amount represented taxa-
ble income. Solomon-like, the Tax Court in turn held that Section
104(a)(2) excluded half of the $20,000 payment from income, while
the remaining $10,000 fell outside Section 104(a)(2) and thus con-
stituted taxable income. An understanding of how such a result
came to pass-and quite logically at that-requires some history.
II. ORIGINS: AMOUNTS RECEIVED AS DAMAGES ON ACCOUNT OF
NONPHYSICAL INJURIES
Section 104(a)(2) dates back to Section 213(b)(6) of the Reve-
nue Act of 1918. The history of that original section suggests that
Congress intended it to codify then-recent administrative leci-
sions. Treasury regulations promulgated early in 1918 under the
Revenue Acts of 1916 and 1917 provided specifically that damages
were taxable, stating that an "[a]mount received as the result of a
suit or compromise for personal injury, being similar to the pro-
ceeds of accident insurance, is to be accounted for as income.",
However, in June 1918, in response to a Treasury inquiry, an At-
torney General's opinion held that accident insurance proceeds
were not taxable, based on the theory that the "human body is a
kind of capital" and the insurance proceeds represented a "conver-
sion of the capital lost through the injury."6 Shortly thereafter,
based on that Attorney General's opinion, the Treasury deter-
4. Id. at 1004-05.
5. Treas. Reg. No. 33, Revised, Part I (1918).
6. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 304 (1918).
[Vol. 50
1989] TAXATION OF DAMAGES 15
mined "upon similar principles that an amount received . . . as a
result of a suit or compromise for personal injuries sustained ...
through accident" was not taxable and revoked its prior regulation
to the contrary. 7 Against this background Congress enacted Sec-
tion 213(b)(6) of the Revenue Act of 1918, which provided that the
term "gross income" did not include: "(6) [ajmounts received,
through accident or health insurance or under workmen's compen-
sation acts, as compensation for personal injuries or sickness, plus
the amount of any damages received whether by suit or agreement
on account of such injuries or sickness. '
Despite the obvious potential breadth of the damages provi-
sion, the earliest administrative interpretations were restrictive. In
1919, Solicitor's Memorandum 957, addressing the taxability of
damages received by a lawyer for libel of his professional reputa-
tion, stated in its entirety that "[m]oney received as damages in
libel proceedings is subject to income tax."9 In 1920, Solicitor's
Memorandum 1384 held that damages received on account of
alienation of a wife's affections were not within the exemption.
This latter opinion conceded that alienation of a wife's affections
constituted a personal injury, and that the statutory language
"taken by itself, would seem to include any personal injury."10
Nonetheless, based on the 1918 background to Section 213(b)(6),
as well as the statute's reference to accident and health insurance
and workmen's compensation, the opinion concluded that it was
"more probable . . . that the term 'personal injuries', as used
therein means physical injuries only."'" The opinion further stated:
Probably the provision of the Revenue Act of 1918 in question, so
far as personal injuries are concerned, is merely declarative of the
conclusions [contained in the 1918 Attorney General's opinion
and in the Treasury decision in response to it] thus stated and
intended to go no further. These conclusions rest . . . upon the
theory of conversion of capital assets. It would follow that per-
sonal injury not resulting in the destruction or diminution in the
value of a capital asset would not be within the exemption. From
no ordinary conception of the term can a wife's affections be re-
garded as constituting capital.'"
Thus the earliest administrative opinions rested the statute on
7. T.D. 2747 (1918).
8. Revenue Act of 1918, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1065-66 (1919).
9. Sol. Mem. 957, 1919-1 C.B. 65.
10. Sol. Mem. 1384, 1920-2 C.B. 71.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 72.
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a loss-of-capital (or return-of-capital) notion, and suggested that
only physical injuries gave rise to such lost capital. Whether judi-
cial interpretations of the damages exclusion would have similarly
limited it to physical injuries is unknown. Later in 1920, the Su-
preme Court, in Eisner v. Macomber,13 held that the stock divi-
dend at issue there was not taxable as income under the Sixteenth
Amendment, clearly reaffirming the proposition that income
should be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or
from both combined. Of course, the Supreme Court subsequently
developed a far more expansive view of what constitutes income, a
view exemplified by the Court's decision in Glenshaw Glass."
Nonetheless, with respect to personal injury damages, Eisner v.
Macomber had a substantial impact.
In 1922, Solicitor's Opinion 132, on the basis of Eisner v. Ma-
comber, modified Solicitor's Memorandum 957 (1919), revoked So-
licitor's Memorandum 1384 (1920), and held that amounts received
as damages for alienation of affections or "defamation of personal
character" or in consideration of surrendering custody of a minor
child did not constitute income.1 5 Opinion 132 noted that "both of
these [earlier] rulings ... were made prior to the decision of the
Supreme Court in Eisner v. Macomber.""
In Stratton's Independence v. Hobart, and in Eisner v. Ma-
comber, the Supreme Court defined income as 'the gain derived
from capital, from labor, or from both combined .......
In the light of these decisions of the Supreme Court it must be
held that there is no gain, and therefore no income, derived from
the receipt of damages for alienation of affections or defamation
of personal character. In either case the right invaded is a per-
sonal right and is in no way transferable . . . If an individual is
possessed of a personal right that is not assignable and not sus-
ceptible of any appraisal in . . . either damages or payment in
compromise for an invasion of that right, it can not be held that
13. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
14. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
15. Sol. Op. 132, I-1 C.B. 92 (1922).
16. Id. at 93. In commenting on the 1919 and the 1920 Memoranda, the Opinion
added that:
Solicitor's Memorandum 1384 correctly held that the [statutory] exemption
does not include damages for alienation of affections, but the question is really
more fundamental, namely, whether such damages are within the legal definition
of income. Similarly, Solicitor's Memorandum 957 may have been correct in hold-
ing that damages received by a lawyer for libel of his professional reputation con-
stitute income. Business libel may be distinguished from ordinary defamation of
character and is not here under consideration. The ruling in Solicitor's Memoran-
dum 957, however, was not limited but apparently applied to libel generally.
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he thereby derives any gain or profit. It is clear, therefore, that
the Government can not tax him on any portion of the sum re-
ceived. This also applies to money received in consideration of
the surrender of the custody of a minor child.'
Solicitor's Opinion 132 thus revoked the distinction previously
drawn between physical and nonphysical injuries, and conceded,
not on the basis of statutory reinterpretation, but rather on the
basis of the Supreme Court's evolving interpretation of income,
that damages received on account of nonphysical personal injuries
were nontaxable.
Judicial confirmation of the excludability of damages for non-
physical injuries came in the seminal case of Hawkins v. Commis-
sioner.8 The taxpayer in Hawkins was president of a corporation
until removed from office by the directors. He subsequently sued
the corporation and individual officers of the corporation for hav-
ing published defamatory statements about him which were injuri-
ous to his personal reputation and to his health. That suit plus two
other suits brought against the taxpayer by two corporate officers
were thereafter settled and dismissed following payment of money
damages to Hawkins. The Board of Tax Appeals held that the
damages received for libel and slander to personal reputation were
indeed nontaxable.' 9 It is striking that the court reached this result
without any reference to the existing statutory exclusion. The tax-
payer had argued for exclusion based on the Supreme Court's defi-
nition of income as gain from capital, labor, or both, and, in effect,
the Board of Tax Appeals agreed:
This ... is ... a case, . . . which in no event involves income. So
far as the evidence shows, the amount which petitioner received
was wholly by way of general damages for the personal injury suf-
fered .... It was compensation for injury to his personal reputa-
tion .... No suggestion is made that there was special damage
paid ... or ... punitive or exemplary damages .... Even to the
economist, character or reputation or other personal attributes
are not capital .... They are not property or goods. Such com-
pensation as general damages adds nothing to the individual ....
It is an attempt to make the plaintiff whole as before the injury."
The Internal Revenue Service acquiesced in the Hawkins deci-
sion, and subsequent rulings and opinions echoed the Hawkins
analysis of "income." For example, the Service concluded in I.T.
17. Id. at 93-94 (citations omitted).
18. 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927), acq., VII-1 C.B. 14 (1928).
19. Id. at 1025.
20. Id. at 1024-25.
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2420 that an award paid to a widow on account of the death of her
husband was "compensation for the loss [of a life] and as such is
not embraced in the general concept of the term 'income'."" Simi-
larly, the Tax Court held that damages for breach of contract to
marry were not taxable as income, based on "[tihe [Supreme
Court] decisions .. .and the principles ... set forth ... in Haw-
kins v. Commissioner."2 As late as 1954, in Revenue Ruling 54-19,
holding that a wrongful death settlement was not taxable to the
decedent's estate or to the dependents who were to receive the pro-
ceeds, the Service merely repeated the conclusion of I.T. 2420 that
"[p]roceeds of this nature, that is compensation for loss of life, are
not embraced in the general concept of the term 'income'."" Fol-
lowing Hawkins, it was clear that damages for nonphysical per-
sonal injuries were excludable from income, and that the exclusion
rested on the judicial definition of "income" rather than any statu-
tory analysis.
Although the Supreme Court reconsidered and expanded the
definition of income in Glenshaw Glass, the Hawkins conclusion
emerged unscathed. Glenshaw Glass involved two separate cases
with a common question, namely, whether the punitive damages
awarded constituted gross income. Neither case involved personal
injuries; both centered on business disputes. The corporate taxpay-
ers claimed that the punitive damage awards each had received did
not fall within the statutory definition of gross income. Instead,
they characterized the damages as nontaxable "windfalls" and
urged the Court to apply the Eisner v. Macomber characterization
of income as gain derived from capital, labor or both combined.
That definition of income had been pivotal in the development of
taxation of personal injury awards. However, the Court in Glen-
shaw Glass essentially relegated that definition to mere historical
interest. According to Glenshaw Glass, the Court in Eisner v. Ma-
comber had simply determined whether a corporate stock dividend
constituted realized gain or only a change in the form of the tax-
payer's investment.
In that context-distinguishing gain from capital-the definition
served a useful purpose. But it was not meant to provide a touch-
stone to all future gross income questions .... Here we have
instances of undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and
over which the taxpayers have complete dominion. The mere fact
that the payments were extracted from the wrongdoers as punish-
21. I.T. 2420, VII-2 C.B. 123 (1928).
22. McDonald v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A. 1340, 1342 (1928).
23. Rev. Rul. 54-19, 1954-1 C.B. 179, 180.
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ment for unlawful conduct cannot detract from their character as
taxable income to the recipients.24
Admittedly, the Supreme Court took care to distinguish the
taxation of punitive damages from the taxation of personal injury
damages. In a much-cited footnote, it commented in dictum that:
The long history of departmental rulings holding personal injury
recoveries nontaxable on the theory that they roughly correspond
to a return of capital cannot support exemption of punitive dam-
ages following injury to property .... Damages for personal in-
jury are by definition compensatory only. Punitive damages, on
the other hand, cannot be considered a restoration of capital for
taxation purposes. 5
The Supreme Court thus did not question the Service's rulings
on personal injury damages or, by extension, the Hawkins decision.
Although Glenshaw Glass effectively rejected the Eisner v. Ma-
comber formulation of income, it did not mandate a reexamination
of the tax treatment of damages for nonphysical personal injuries
and, indeed, no reexamination occurred.
The disinclination of the Internal Revenue Service to recon-
sider the tax treatment of nonphysical personal injury awards be-
came clear in a series of rulings, issued from 1955 to 1958, on war-
related damages. In Revenue Ruling 55-132, the Service held that
U.S. payments made to World War II prisoners of war under the
War Claims Act of 1948 on account of enemy violations of the Ge-
neva Convention relating to provision of food, forced labor and in-
humane treatment, were "in the nature of reimbursement for the
loss of personal rights" and therefore did not constitute gross in-
come.26 No authority was cited for the holding, but the loss-of-per-
sonal-rights rationale clearly reflects the Hawkins emphasis on the
nontaxability of compensation for damages to "strictly personal at-
tributes." Revenue Ruling 56-462 held, solely on the authority of
Revenue Ruling 55-132, that similar payments made under the
War Claims Act to Korean War prisoners were "compensation for
the loss of their personal rights" and, as such, not includable in
gross income.2 7 Revenue Ruling 56-518 dealt with the tax treat-
ment of payments made by the Federal Republic of Germany to
former German citizens, now U.S. citizens or residents, who were
persecuted by the Nazi regime "because of anti-Nazi persuasion or
24. 348 U.S. 426, 431.
25. Id. at 432 n.8.
26. Rev. Rul. 55-132, 1955-1 C.B. 213.
27. Rev. Rul. 56-462, 1956-2 C.B. 20.
1989]
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
for reasons of race, faith, or philosophy of life."'2 8 Citing Revenue
Ruling 55-132 as its authority, Revenue Ruling 56-518 held that:
[Tihe compensation paid ...on account of such persecution
which resulted in damage to life, body, health, liberty, or to pro-
fessional or economic advancement, are [sic] in the nature of re-
imbursement for the deprivation of civil or personal rights and do
not constitute taxable income .... 29
On similar facts and reasoning, the Service reached the same con-
clusions in Revenue Ruling 58-370 with respect to payments by
Austria to former Austrian citizens persecuted by the Nazi re-
gime.30 The payments were held to be reimbursement for the loss
of civil and personal rights and, accordingly, not taxable.
Further evidence of the Service's disinclination to reexamine
its historic view of nonphysical personal injury damages came al-
most twenty years after Glenshaw Glass in the promulgation of
Revenue Ruling 74-77.31 The ruling revisited the tax status of dam-
ages received on account of alienation of affections or in considera-
tion of the surrender of the custody of a minor child, two of the
three issues considered by Solicitor's Opinion 132 over fifty years
earlier. After noting that alienation of affections and custody "re-
late to personal or family rights, not property rights, and may be
treated together," Revenue Ruling 74-77 simply stated that the
amounts received as damages "are not income," and then con-
cluded that "Solicitor's Opinion 132 ... is hereby superseded since
the position stated therein is set forth under the current statute
and regulations in this Revenue Ruling. 3 2 The ruling thus effec-
tively reaffirmed Solicitor's Opinion 132 and, by analogy, Hawkins
v. Commissioner as well.33
There is a decided irony in this. The teaching of Solicitor's
Opinion 132, Hawkins and the war-claims rulings-that awards for
nonphysical personal injuries such as damage to reputation or dep-
rivation of personal or civil rights are not includable in in-
come-ultimately becomes part of the fabric of Section 104(a)(2).
But these authorities were based on the Eisner v. Macomber defi-
nition of gross income and not on interpretations of Section
28. Rev. Rul. 56-518, 1956-2 C.B. 25.
29. Id.
30. Rev. Rul. 58-370, 1958-2 C.B. 14.
31. Rev. Rul. 74-77, 1974-1 C.B. 33.
32. Id.
33. No statute or regulation was cited in the text of the ruling, but the heading of the
ruling referred to both Sections 104 and 61, and regulations thereunder thusly: "Section
104.- Compensation for Injuries or Sickness. 26 C.F.R. 1.104-1: Compensation for injuries
or sickness. (Also Section 61; 1.61-1)." Id.
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104(a)(2) or its predecessors. Indeed, but for the Eisner v. Ma-
comber decision, Solicitor's Opinion 132 and Hawkins v. Commis-
sioner might never have been issued, and the early administrative
determinations in the 1919 Solicitor's Memorandum 957 and the
1920 Solicitor's Memorandum 1384-that the predecessor of Sec-
tion 104(a)(2) did not encompass nonphysical personal inju-
ries-might have become the law. Solicitor's Opinion 132 suggested
as much in stating that "Solicitor's Memorandum 1384 correctly
held that the [statutory] exemption ... does not include damages
for alienation of affections ....""
It is curious that a line of authority based on a discredited
theory of gross income which does not rely on or purport to inter-
pret (and in most cases does not even acknowledge) an existing
statutory exclusion should later be viewed as defining the scope of
the statutory exclusion. Nonetheless, these authorities provide the
basis for the unanimous view of the courts and the Service that the
term "personal injury" as used in Section 104(a)(2) embraces non-
physical as well as physical injuries.
While the nonstatutory exclusion theory of Solicitor's Opinion
132 and Hawkins remained viable after Glenshaw Glass, injured
taxpayers, their counsel and the courts nevertheless began relying
on Section 104(a)(2) as authority for the exclusion of personal in-
jury awards. One can only speculate that this emphasis on Section
104(a)(2), a provision almost entirely ignored for over forty years,
was prompted by taxpayers' desire for certainty in view of the sig-
nificantly broadened scope of "gross income" announced by Glen-
shaw Glass. Section 104(a)(2) quickly emerged as the primary au-
thority for the exclusion of personal injury awards.
This is not to suggest that the specific holdings and theory of
Solicitor's Opinion 132, Hawkins and the war-claims rulings did
not remain important. Indeed, as suggested by Revenue Ruling 74-
77, these nonstatutory authorities were incorporated as part of the
fabric of Section 104(a)(2). Subsequent to Glenshaw Glass, the
courts appear to have assumed that Section 104(a)(2) merely codi-
fied the nonstatutory exclusion theory of Solicitor's Opinion 132,
Hawkins and the war-claims rulings. An early case reflecting this
merger is Starrels v. Commissioner.3 5 In Starrels, the taxpayer had
been paid for consenting, in advance of the production of a motion
picture, to release any right-of-privacy claims she might have
based on the motion picture. The Tax Court held that the pay-
34. Sol. Op. 132, I-1 C.B. 92, 93.
35. 35 T.C. 646 (1961).
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ment was taxable, finding no evidence of any actual invasion of
privacy. Even had the taxpayer established an invasion of privacy
based on the motion picture, the Tax Court expressed "considera-
ble doubt" regarding the application of the "narrowly conceived"
Section 104(a)(2) exclusion to such voluntary advance waivers of
personal rights.3 6 Affirming the Tax Court, the Ninth Circuit chose
to opine on the "underlying purpose" of the statutory exclusion. In
so doing, the court reinforced the loss-of-personal-rights analysis of
the war-claims rulings and the early departmental rulings de-
scribed previously:
Damages paid for personal injuries are excluded from gross in-
come because they make the taxpayer whole from a previous loss
of personal rights-because, in effect they restore a loss to capital.
See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Glenshaw Glass Co.,
342 U.S. 426, 432 n.8... and, in addition to the department rul-
ings there cited, [the war-claims rulings] Revenue Ruling 58-132;.
. Revenue Ruling 56-462;... Revenue Ruling 56-518; ... Reve-
nue Ruling 57-505; ... Revenue Ruling 58-370; ... and Revenue
Ruling 58-500 .... "
After stating that this rationale does not apply to receipts that add
to wealth instead of compensating for loss, the Ninth Circuit, quot-
ing footnote eight of Glenshaw Glass in its entirety, concluded
that the footnote's restoration-of-capital reasoning meant that Sec-
tion 104(a)(2) did not apply to payments for injuries (as in Star-
rels) that never occurred. 8
While the Starrels result was entirely appropriate, the Ninth
Circuit opinion reflected the continuing influence of Hawkins and
Solicitor's Opinion 132, even though those authorities were not
mentioned explicitly. As indicated, the Ninth Circuit's loss-of-per-
sonal-rights rationale for Section 104(a)(2) relied in part on the
war-claims rulings and in part on footnote eight of Glenshaw
Glass. The war-claims rulings, as noted, did not refer to any stat-
ute for authority but simply pronounced that compensation for
deprivation of civil or personal rights was not taxable income.
Footnote eight of Glenshaw Glass relied on the line of administra-
36. Id. at 648. The Tax Court commented in a footnote that the legal basis for the
taxpayer's claim for exclusion was "not clearly articulated .... We think that the payment
for surrender of the right of privacy consists of gross income under section 61, and no statu-
tory provision other than section 104(a)(2) has been suggested as a basis for excluding the
payment from gross income." Perhaps the lack of articulation was due in part to the histori-
cal treatment of personal injury damages as an income definition matter, rather than a mat-
ter of interpreting an exclusion provision. Id. at note 2.
37. 304 F.2d 574, 576 (9th Cir. 1962).
38. Id. at 576-77.
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tive rulings based on Solicitor's Opinion 132.
Thus, as demonstrated by the decisions in Starrels, the courts,
without examining the conceptual underpinnings of the early ad-
ministrative rulings and cases like Hawkins, recognized the contin-
uing viability of those authorities in the application of Section
104(a)(2). The merger of these authorities with Section 104(a)(2)
set the stage for further decisions, including very recent decisions
such as Byrne which broadly apply Section 104(a)(2).
III. THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 104(a)(2)
With the emergence of Section 104(a)(2) as the authority for
the exclusion of personal injury awards and the determination that
"personal injury" as used in that Section encompassed nonphysical
personal injuries, most of the cases and rulings applying Section
104(a)(2) have focused on two issues.3 9 The first issue (and by far
the more important) is definitional: what nonphysical injuries are
encompassed by the term "personal injury"? The second issue is
-evidentiary: whether a taxpayer has borne the burden of establish-
ing that a settlement or an award was received on account of per-
sonal injuries. A review of the case law suggests the close interrela-
tionship between these two issues. As discussed herein, the courts
have often blurred the distinction between these issues.
A. Defining the Scope of "Personal Injury"
Given the merger described above of Hawkins, Solicitor's
Opinion 132 and the war-claims rulings into Section 104(a)(2), the
term "personal injury" as used in Section 104(a)(2) could be ex-
pected to encompass a broad range of nonphysical injuries. The
Treasury did nothing to dispel that notion. Indeed, in promulgat-
ing regulations interpreting Section 104(a)(2), the Treasury did not
attempt to define "personal injury" as used in Section 104(a)(2)
and instead concentrated its efforts on the definition of the term
"damages."' Presumably, the regulation's drafters were satisfied
that the term "personal injury" was self-explanatory. Recently, the
Tax Court in its decision in Threlkeld v. Commissioner,41 con-
firmed the enormous breadth of the term "personal injury" when it
39. A third issue, i.e., whether punitive damages constitute "damages" within the
meaning of that term in Section 104(a)(2), has been commented on extensively in the litera-
ture, and the authors have suggested elsewhere their own views on this matter. See Burke &
Friel, Recent Developments in the Income Taxation of Individuals, 9 Rv. TAX'N INDIVS.
292, 304-05 (1985).
40. See Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in 1970).
41. 87 T.C. 1294 (1986). See infra, text accompanying notes 54-61.
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stated, "Exclusion under section 104 will be appropriate if com-
pensatory damages are received on account of any invasion of the
rights that an individual is granted by virtue of being a person in
the sight of the law."'42
Oddly enough, other than the arguably artificial limits the
courts have occassionally created, the only limit on the term "per-
sonal injury" is in the definition of "damages" in the regulations
interpreting Section 104(a)(2). In relevant part, those regulations
provide:
Section 104(a)(2) excludes from gross income the amount of any
damages received (whether by suit or agreement) on account of
personal injuries or sickness. The term "damages received
(whether by suit or agreement)" means an amount received (other
than workmen's compensation) ... upon tort or tort type rights,
or through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of such
prosection4
While defining "damages," this regulation essentially limits
the meaning of "personal injury" in Section 104(a)(2) to injuries of
a "tort or tort type" nature. Thus, a recovery on a contract theory
will not be excludable under Section 104(a)(2). This regulation,
rather than serving as a helpful limitation on the scope of Section
104(a)(2), has proven problematic in its application because of the
significant overlap between contract and tort theory.
The specific parameters of the term "personal injury" in Sec-
tion 104(a)(2) have been defined primarily through cases arising
out of business and employment contexts. Employment disputes,
especially those resulting from termination of employment or de-
nial of promotion or tenure, often involve claims of discrimination,
sexual harassment, libel or slander and bad faith in addition to
breach of contract claims. Needless to say, the injured employee
would prefer to characterize any settlement or award received as a
result of such a dispute as an award to which Section 104(a)(2)
applies. Consequently, the courts and the Service have had to ana-
lyze a variety of specific claims to determine as a threshold matter
whether there has been a personal injury or whether an amount
has been received "on account of personal injury." The recent case
law and the rulings in the employment context reflect an acknowl-
edgement by the courts and the Service of the broad range of non-
physical personal injury awards potentially excludable under Sec-
tion 104(a)(2). At the same time, these authorities demonstrate the
42. Id. at 1308.
43. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in 1970).
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uneasiness of the Service and the courts in permitting an exclusion
for what otherwise appears to be taxable income in the nature of
compensation or profit. Apparently as a result of that uneasiness,
courts have occasionally used an analysis of personal injury incon-
sistent with the language of the statute and the regulations. An
examination of recent decisions highlights the difficulties encoun-
tered in applying Section 104(a)(2) to amounts received as a result
of employment-related disputes. This article categorizes and exam-
ines those authorities with reference to the nature of the award
received: awards for injury to one's professional reputation, awards
for injuries to one's constitutionally protected rights, and awards
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act.
1. Injury to One's Business Reputation
While allowing employees to exclude settlements for damage
to personal reputation, the courts and the Service initially refused
to permit taxpayers to exclude damages for injury to their profes-
sional reputation." In Roemer v. Commissioner,"5 the Tax Court
denied the application of Section 104(a)(2) to a compensatory
damage award received by a taxpayer, an independent insurance
broker, as a result of a "grossly defamatory" credit report. The
credit report, done in conjunction with the taxpayer's application
for a license to sell insurance on behalf of a particular insurance
company, raised serious questions regarding the competency and
honesty of the taxpayer. As a result of the report, the taxpayer was
denied the license, lost business, and was injured in his relations
with his friends, most of whom were also his clients. According to
the Tax Court, the damages compensated the taxpayer primarily
for injury to his business reputation." As such, the injury was not
a "personal injury" within the meaning of Section 104(a)(2).47 In so
characterizing the injury, the court emphasized that the taxpayer
had relied on lost business income as evidence of the damage sus-
tained as a result of the defamatory credit report."
The Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court in Roemer, noting
that the Tax Court had confused "a personal injury with its conse-
quences and illogically distinguish[ed] physical from nonphysical
44. While addressing the defamation of personal character and alienation of affection,
Solicitor's Opinion 132 specifically acknowledged that "[b]usiness libel may be distinguished
from ordinary defamation of character."
45. 79 T.C. 398 (1982).
46. Id. at 406.
47. Id. at 407.
48. Id. at 406.
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personal injuries."'4 9 Citing Solicitor's Opinion 132 for the proposi-
tion that nonphysical injuries are personal injuries and that awards
for nonphysical injuries are excludable from gross income, the
court emphasized that "The relevant distinction that should be
made is between personal and nonpersonal injuries, not between
physical and nonphysical injuries. '50 In holding that the taxpayer
had suffered a "personal injury" within the meaning of Section
104(a)(2), the Ninth Circuit stated:
[A]lI defamatory statements attack an individual's good name.
This injury to the person should not be confused with the deriva-
tive consequences of the defamatory attack, i.e., the loss of repu-
tation in the community and any resulting loss of income. The
nonpersonal consequences of a personal injury, such as a loss of
future income, are often the most persuasive means of proving
the extent of the injury that was suffered. The personal nature of
an injury should not be defined by its effect.5'
However, the Service in Revenue Ruling 85-14352 announced
that it would not follow the Ninth Circuit decision in Roemer. Ac-
cording to the Service:
In factual situations similar to Roemer, where the libelous state-
ments were directed primarily to the individual in the individ-
ual's business capacity, with the result that the primary harm suf-
fered by the individual was loss of business income, the individual
has not suffered a personal injury for purposes of Section
104(a)(2) of the Code.5 3
In Threlkeld v. Commissioner," however, the Tax Court re-
cently conceded the error of its position in Roemer. The taxpayer
in Threlkeld commenced and then settled (in return for payment
to him of $300,000) a state court civil suit alleging malicious prose-
cution. The settlement agreement specifically allocated $75,000 of
the total settlement to Threlkeld's release of his claims for damage
to his professional reputation. Considering the application of Sec-
tion 104(a)(2) to the settlement, the Tax Court concluded first that
despite its own longstanding recognition of a distinction between
professional and personal reputation, the injury alleged was a "per-
sonal injury"; and second that the amounts received were "dam-
49. 716 F.2d 693, 697 (9th Cir. 1983).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 699.
52. 1985-2 C.B. 55.
53. Id. at 56.
54. 87 T.C. 1294.
[Vol. 50
TAXATION OF DAMAGES
ages" under Treasury Regulation Section 1.104-1(c). 5
Examining its lengthy history of support for the distinction
between professional and personal reputation, the Tax Court
found that only in Roemer had it relied solely on the distinction in
deciding a case, that two appellate courts had questioned or invali-
dated the distinction, and that the distinction simply lacked a
"firm foundation" in its own case law and was ultimately unper-
suasive.56 By way of example, the Tax Court considered the hypo-
thetical case of a surgeon's loss of a finger as a result of another's
tort. In that case, evidence of loss of future income would be a
major component in determining damages, and those damages
would be excluded.5 7 The court in Threlkeld concluded that since
Section 104(a)(2) is not limited to physical injuries, the rule could
be no different when amounts received on account of a nonphysical
injury include compensation for the loss of future income.
With regard to whether the taxpayer's suit for malicious pros-
ecution satisfied the "tort or tort type" standard of the regulations,
the Tax Court noted that state law classifications should generally
be relied upon, except where the state law classifications are insuf-
ficient because the claim is unclear or when there are several
claims, both personal and nonpersonal 5 8 The Tax Court reviewed
the law of Tennessee, the state in which the action arose, and con-
cluded that Tennessee would treat the malicious prosecution as
similar to an action for defamation. The court therefore held the
"tort or tort type" standard of the regulation satisfied.5 9
The Sixth Circuit recently affirmed the Tax Court decision in
Threlkeld and agreed with the Tax Court and the Ninth Circuit in
Roemer that injury to one's reputation is personal regardless of
whether the primary effect of such injury is on one's professional
pursuits.60 In this respect the court specifically rejected Revenue
Ruling 85-143 as establishing an unreasonable standard.61
While affirming the broad scope of the term "personal injury"
in Section 104(a)(2), the Ninth Circuit decision in Roemer and the
Tax Court and Sixth Circuit decisions in Threlkeld opinions are
perhaps most significant in their refusal to permit the conse-
quences of an injury, for example, lost income, to define the char-
acter of the injury. As illustrated by the Tax Court decision in
55. Id. at 1307-08.
56. Id. at 1304.
57. Id. at 1300.
58. Id. at 1305-06.
59. Id. at 1307-08.
60. 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988).
61. Id. at 84.
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Roemer, the temptation exists to analyze the application of Section
104(a)(2) in light of the nature of the award given. That is not
what the statute requires. Rather, as emphasized by the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Roemer, the key question is whether the injury complained
of is a personal injury. If so, "any damages" received are
excludable.
2. Violation of Constitutional Rights
The broad definition of "personal injury" suggested by the
Tax Court in the war-claims rulings and most recently articulated
in Threlkeld is reflected in the recent decisions in Bent v. Commis-
sioner6 2 and Metzger v. Commissioner," addressing the tax treat-
ment of awards for violations of an individual's civil rights. In Bent
v. Commissioner, a teacher at a public high school criticized the
school administration, and the school board subsequently decided
not to rehire him. One of the stated reasons for his termination
was his display of "unprofessional behavior by consistently down-
grading the school, the staff, and the administration."" Bent ulti-
mately filed a state court action against the board, alleging both
contract violations and various violations of his rights under the
United States Constitution, including a constitutional tort claim
under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.65 After a trial on the issue of liabil-
ity only, the state court concluded that Bent's reemployment had
been denied for reasons which, in part, abridged his First Amend-
ment rights to freedom of speech regarding his views of his public
employer and administrators. The state court rejected Bent's other
claims and continued the case on the matter of damages. The par-
ties subsequently settled the case for $24,000 and the court dis-
missed Bent's complaint with prejudice. Neither the general re-
lease he signed nor the $24,000 check from the school board's
insurance carrier made any allocation of the settlement.6 6 Although
there was some evidence to the contrary, the Tax Court found that
62. 87 T.C. 236 (1986).
63. 88 T.C. 834 (1987).
64. 87 T.C. at 239.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
66. Bent paid $8,000 of the settlement to his state education association on account of
the legal representation it had provided in the matter. 87 T.C. at 242.
[Vol. 50
1989] TAXATION OF DAMAGES
the board paid Bent the $24,000 settlement entirely on the basis of
the state court decision that Bent's free speech rights under the
First Amendment had been violated. 7
In concluding that the settlement was excludable under Sec-
tion 104(a)(2), the Tax Court relied on the Supreme Court decision
in Wilson v. Garcia" which, in a different context, held that all
Section 1983 claims are best characterized as involving claims for
personal injuries.6 The Tax Court noted that Congress would have
considered the remedies provided in the original Section 1983 "to
be more analogous to tort claims for personal injury than, for ex-
ample, to claims for damages to property or breach of contract. '7°
Thus, the $24,000 settlement award satisfied both the "personal
injury" and "tort or tort type" standards of Section 104(a)(2) and
the regulations thereunder. 71 While Bent addressed only a settle-
ment payment in a Section 1983 action for denial of the taxpayer's
freedom of speech, given its determination that the "personal in-
jury" language of Section 104(a)(2) reaches those rights most anal-
ogous to tort type rights, and given the Supreme Court's determi-
nation that Section 1983 actions involve precisely that type of
right, it seems apparent that the Tax Court would have excluded
damages received on account of any Section 1983 claim.
The Third Circuit recently affirmed the Tax Court decision in
67. Id. at 243. The Tax Court, however, noted that in a post-trial brief in state court,
prior to settlement, Bent stated that "the parties have conferred and agreed that for pur-
poses of briefing, the special damages ... shall be viewed" as "wage loss differential" of
$12,000, attorney's fees of $12,000, and $6,150 in various other costs. Id. at 241. Moreover,
the insurance company's own "Notice of Close-Out" stated that the $24,000 settlement rep-
resented $12,000 for "[r]einstatement of wage loss" and $12,000 for attorney's fees, and its
representative testified in the Tax Court that such was his belief. Id. at 242. The Commis-
sioner thus argued that the settlement was taxable compensation plus a negotiated attor-
ney's fee, but given the state court's rejection of all claims except the First Amendment
claim, and the absence of any allocation in the release or on the check, the Tax Court held
to the contrary. "[W]e view the instant case as being equivalent to a situation where the
settlement agreement provided the basis upon which the settlement payment was made.
Accordingly in this situation, we need not engage in an analysis of the 'intent of the payor'
to establish the nature of the payment." Id. at 246. Furthermore, "Consideration of a tax-
payer's lost wages is appropriate in disposing of a sec. 1983 claim ...as well as ...an
employment contract claim. It follows that this evidence is consistent with petitioner's case
as well as with respondent's case." Id. at 250.
68. 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
69. Id. at 280.
70. Id. at 277.
71. The remaining issue in Bent involved the deductibility of the $8,000 in legal fees
paid to the state education association. Since Section 265(1) of the Code denies a deduction
for expenses allocable to tax-exempt income, and since the legal fees were allocable to the
$24,000 settlement excluded from income, the Tax Court held the fees nondeductible. 87
T.C. at 251.
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Bent. 2 In its decision, the circuit court relied on the analysis of
Roemer to reject the Commissioner's argument that the amounts
received were essentially nothing more than lost compensation and
should therefore be subject to tax. Echoing the Ninth Circuit's
analysis in Roemer, the Third Circuit emphasized that the conse-
quences of an injury, for example, lost compensation, did not de-
fine the nature of the injury.71
Following Bent, the Tax Court had occasion to consider again
the meaning of "personal injury" as used in Section 104(a)(2). In
Metzger v. Commissioner,74 the taxpayer, an associate professor of
Spanish at Muhlenberg College in Pennsylvania, complained to the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission and the United States
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission that the college, in
denying her tenure, had discriminated against her on the basis of
sex and national origin. Prior to filing her complaints with the
state and federal commissions, the taxpayer sued the college for
breach of contract in a Pennsylvania state court. She did not assert
any personal injury claims in state court.7 5
After the United States Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission found reasonable cause for her complaint, the tax-
payer commenced an action in federal court alleging that the col-
lege had violated her Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights as well as various sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
When the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission scheduled
public hearings, the parties commenced settlement negotiations.
As a result of the negotiations, the taxpayer received $75,000.
An indemnification agreement signed by the college and the
taxpayer recited that $37,500 of the settlement represented satis-
faction of the taxpayer's wage claims and that the remainder of the
settlement was in satisfaction of all of her other claims. The agree-
ment specifically provided: "[T]his division of payment is made for
tax purposes only in order to satisfy Internal Revenue Rulings
dealing with discrimination claim settlement .... ",71 The general
release and indemnification agreement executed by the taxpayer
recited that the college did not admit any of the taxpayer's allega-
tions and also that the college agreed to the settlement only to
avoid litigation. Furthermore, the college conditioned its payment
72. 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987).
73. Id. at 70.
74. 88 T.C. 834.
75. The taxpayer voluntarily discontinued her Pennsylvania state court proceeding
prior to negotiating a settlement with the college. Id. at 841 n.7.
76. Id. at 843 (court's emphasis deleted).
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to the taxpayer on her release of all claims against the college aris-
ing out of the employment relationship."7
Relying on Section 104(a)(2), the taxpayer excluded one half
of the $75,000 settlement from her gross income and also deducted
her entire $7,750 legal fee. In assessing a deficiency against the tax-
payer, the Service claimed that the entire $75,000 was includable
in the taxpayer's gross income.7
As in Bent, the Tax Court concluded that both the "personal
injury" and the "tort or tort type" requirements of Section
104(a)(2) had been satisfied. 9 Considering first the taxpayer's fed-
eral court action, the Tax Court noted that the taxpayer had
grounded her action against the college on the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments and inter alia on Section 1981. With re-
spect to whether the taxpayer's federal court action was based on
"tort or tort type rights," the Tax Court, relying on Bent, empha-
sized that Section 104(a)(2) extends to damages on account of legal
rights that are more analogous to tort type rights than to any other
legal category of rights.8 Separately analyzing each of the federal
statutory provisions cited, the Tax Court concluded that the tax-
payer's action based on, inter alia, Section 1981 was an action
based on "tort or tort type rights."81 In addition, the court con-
cluded that the taxpayer's action under the statutory provisions
was in the nature of a "personal injury" action as required for ex-
clusion under Section 104(a)(2).2 In this regard, the Tax Court, as
in Bent, relied on a number of federal cases83 in which courts
found that state statutes of limitation relating to personal injuries
were applicable to actions under, inter alia, Section 1981 because
those actions could properly be viewed "as tort claims brought to
redress personal injuries." '84 In essence, the Tax Court position is
that these Civil Rights Act provisions address rights that are guar-
77. Id. at 844.
78. Id. at 846. Alternatively, the Service contended that if any of the settlement were
excludable, a proportionate part of the $7,750 legal fee would not be deductible. In holding
that the taxpayer was entitled to exclude part of the settlement, the Tax Court nevertheless
agreed with the Service that the fees would have to be allocated between the excludable and
the includable portions of the award. Id. at 860. Section 265(1) disallows a deduction for
those fees allocable to the excludable portion of the award.
79. Id. at 850-58.
80. Id. at 851.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 851-56.
83. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777
F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1985); McCausland v. Mason County Bd. of Educ., 649 F.2d 278 (4th Cir.
1981); and Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894 (3d Cir.
1977).
84. 88 T.C. at 853.
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anteed to the person and that denial of these rights constitutes a
personal injury.
The Tax Court next considered the taxpayer's complaint to
the Federal Commission wherein the taxpayer had relied on Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. While the relief afforded under
Title VII of the Act may be different from the relief accorded
under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, the Tax Court concluded that the
injuries the taxpayer complained of under Title VII were essen-
tially the same as the injuries she asserted under 42 U.S.C. Section
1981 and, therefore, the taxpayer's Title VII claims, like her Sec-
tion 1981 claims, were tort type personal injury claims.8 5 Having
concluded that all of taxpayer's legal actions (other than the state
court action) were personal injury "tort or tort type" actions, the
court held that no less than $37,500 of the settlement amount was
excludable under Section 104(a)(2).86 Because the taxpayer did not
assert that any more than $37,500 of the settlement should be ex-
cluded, the Tax Court held that it would not consider whether any
greater amount was excludable.8 7
Bent and Metzger not only reaffirm the breadth of the term
"personal injury" but also suggest the importance to the courts of
the regulation requirement that the award arise out of "tort or tort
type" activity of the payor. As suggested by Bent, courts will be
required to analyze applicable state law as well as relevant federal
precedent to determine whether an action is a tort or tort type
rather than a contract or property action. Considering the fact that
claims arising in the employment context almost invariably can be
characterized as being based partly on contract theory and partly
on tort theory, courts will find the analysis used in both Bent and
Metzger difficult to apply. Furthermore, given the variations in
state law, the same set of facts may yield a different result under
Section 104(a)(2), depending on the state in which an action is
brought.
85. Id. at 856. The taxpayer complained to the Pennsylvania Human Relations Com-
mission that the college had discriminated against her in violation of the Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act. Id. at 839. The Tax Court noted that the Act was essentially a codifi-
cation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and that damages for a violation of the Act
were excludable under Section 104(a)(2). Id. at 858.
86. Id. at 858.
87. Id. In view of its conclusions regarding the nature of the claims asserted, and in
view of Threlkeld, the taxpayer might have been successful in arguing that the entire
amount of the award was excludable.
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3. Back Pay under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
the Equal Pay Act
As Threlkeld, Bent and Metzger demonstrate, the courts have
been willing to acknowledge the broad scope of nonphysical per-
sonal injuries occurring in the employment context which may trig-
ger the benefits of Section 104(a)(2). Nevertheless, the courts and
the Service have likewise demonstrated their concern that awards
which closely resemble compensation not be excluded from gross
income. A comparison of two cases, Hodge v. Commissioner,88 and
Thompson v. Commissioner,"9 suggests the difficulties which con-
front the courts in the employment context.
In Hodge, the taxpayer sought to exclude from income an
amount he had received in settlement of a job discrimination suit
brought by certain employees of a trucking concern against their
employer. Relying on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
employees complained that the trucking firm had denied them a
transfer to higher paying routes because of their race. The Tax
Court, characterizing the complaint, noted:
[T]he complaint did not allege that the [employer's] discrimina-
tory acts personally injured the plaintiffs. In their prayer for re-
lief, plaintiffs' only claim for a monetary award was for back pay
based on the difference between the salary for a line driver and
the salary for a city driver from the time of discrimination to the
date of judgment. The prayer did not contain a plea for personal
injury damages.90
The taxpayer and other similarly situated employees received
cash settlements which the district court had characterized as
"back pay and damages."'" The taxpayer contended that the entire
amount was excludable under Section 104(a)(2). The Tax Court re-
jected the taxpayer's argument that job discrimination causes per-
sonal injury and that any amount recovered for such discrimina-
tion must be considered damages received on account of personal
injury. Noting that the Civil Rights Act empowers a court to order
payment of back pay and that back pay is normally an item of
gross income, the court refused to find that any part of the settle-
ment was excludable:
88. 64 T.C. 616 (1975).
89. 89 T.C. 632 (1987).
90. Hodge, 64 T.C. at 617. Note that at one point in the proceedings, an attorney for
the plaintiffs threatened to amend the complaint to include allegations of personal injuries
but never did so.
91. Id. at 620.
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Had there been no discrimination against the petitioner, he would
have received a better job without a lawsuit and would have paid
more taxes on increased pay as received. Because of discrimina-
tion, he received increased pay later than he should have, but this
is no reason to exclude that pay from gross income. Use of the
adjective "back" in the phrase "back pay" indicates a recovery of
wages which should have been paid but were not.2
The court explained in a footnote that its holding was limited
to a determination that an award of back pay under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 is taxable. 3 The court specifically stated that it
did not have to reach the issue of whether, as a matter of law,
amounts recovered under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may consti-
tute personal injury damages within the meaning of Section
104(a)(2)."'
In Thompson v. Commissioner, the taxpayer, an employee of
the Government Printing Office, was awarded back pay under Title
VII and the Equal Pay Act. The taxpayer and other female em-
ployees had filed a sex discrimination claim against their employer
contending that they did not receive the same wages as male em-
ployees even though they performed work requiring the same skill,
effort and responsibility as that of male workers. In addition to the
back pay, the taxpayer also received liquidated damages under the
Equal Pay Act. The taxpayer contended that both the backpay
and the liquidated damages were excludable under Section
104(a)(2). Relying on Threlkeld, the taxpayer argued that the
amounts she received were for the "invasions of the rights granted
to her by virtue of being a person. '9 5 The taxpayer argued that her
action was not premised on any contractual violation, but rather
on the tortious conduct of her employer in sexually discriminating
against her.
Rejecting the taxpayer's claim, the Tax Court concluded that
an award of back pay under the Equal Pay Act "is more in the
nature of a payment for a contract violation than for a tort type
right."9 " The employer under the Act was required to pay an equal
92. Id. at 619.
93. Id. at n.7.
94. Id. at 619. In Revenue Ruling 72-341, 1972-2 C.B. 32, the Service considered the
case of employees who had received settlement awards for employment discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The settlement amounts represented the
difference between what the employees would have earned had there been no discrimination
and the amount that they actually earned. The Revenue Ruling provides that the settlement
awards constitute taxable income.
95. Thompson, 89 T.C. at 643.
96. Id. at 646.
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amount for equal work regardless of sex.9 7 In this case, the em-
ployer "owed" the taxpayer the difference between what she was
paid and what similarly-situated males were paid. Payment of that
which was "owed" did not constitute payment of damages for the
personal injury of sex discrimination. Rather, it was payment for
work performed.9 8
By contrast, the court concluded that the liquidated damages
received by the taxpayer were excludable as damages received on
account of a personal injury, that is sex discrimination. 9 Although
the liquidated damages were measured by the amount of back pay
awarded, the court emphasized that they were intended to com-
pensate the taxpayer for intangible losses sustained by the tax-
payer as a result of the sex discrimination.100 Consequently, the
taxpayer in Thompson was entitled to exclude part of the award
received under the Equal Pay Act.
The result in Hodge appears to be inconsistent with the Ser-
vice's position in Revenue Ruling 85-97 01 that the exclusion of
Section 104(a)(2) extends to personal injury damages allocable to
lost wages. If a personal injury has occurred, Section 104(a)(2) au-
thorizes the exclusion of "any damages" received. No difference ex-
ists between wages lost because a taxpayer is unable to work as a
result of a physical injury and the back pay awarded in Hodge be-
cause the tortious conduct of an employer prevented the taxpayer
from working on a more lucrative trucking route. Likewise, Hodge
appears to conflict with both Threlkeld and Thompson. As noted
by the Thompson court, the taxpayer in that case had a clearer
wage claim than in Hodge. In Thompson, the taxpayer actually
performed the work but was not compensated properly for the
work; whereas in Hodge, the taxpayer never had the opportunity to
perform the work. Threlkeld and Thompson both teach that the
consequences of the injury are not determinative of the nature of
the injury. Yet, even though the court in Hodge indicated that it
did not decide whether there was a personal injury, it nonetheless
seems that the Hodge court did define the injury by the nature of
the damages sought. Thompson itself is troubling in that the ad-
mittedly tortious conduct of the employer gave rise to an award
which in part was taxable and in part excludable. In view of the
Section 104(a)(2) language "any damages," the court seems to have
97. Id.
98. Id. at 648.
99. Id. at 650.
100. Id. at 649-60.
101. 1985-2 C.B. 50.
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used a hypertechnical analysis in reaching its conclusion. '
Both Hodge and Thompson indicate the concern of the courts
and the Service in permitting the exclusion of awards with a strong
compensation flavoring. That concern seems well founded in view
of the general notion that compensation is taxable as gross in-
come. 103 Nonetheless, the specific language of Section 104(a)(2) ex-
cluding "any damages on account of personal injury," Revenue
Ruling 85-97 authorizing the exclusion of lost wages, and the
courts' interpretation of "personal injury," seem at odds with the
analysis in Hodge and to some extent the analysis in Thompson.
Given the foregoing review of the history of judicial treatment
of personal injury awards, the result in Byrne v. Commissioner °4 is
not surprising. However, Byrne does illustrate the difficulties fac-
ing courts in applying the "tort or tort type" standard of the regu-
lations. In Byrne, as part of the settlement agreement between the
EEOC and Grammer, Byrne's employer, the petitioner released
Grammer from any liability for "any matter relating to or arising
out of the [EEOC] charges" and any liability arising out of the
cause of action filed in district court by the EEOC against Gram-
mer.105 In determining whether the settlement was intended to
102. In Private Letter Ruling 8833014 (May 20, 1988) the Service followed Hodge in
denying an exclusion under Section 104(a)(2) for amounts received by a taxpayer in settle-
ment of a sex discrimination action brought by the taxpayer under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. The taxpayer sought back pay in an amount sufficient
to negate the economic loss caused her by the employer's discriminatory actions. As in
Hodge, the Service concluded that neither the complaint nor the settlement agreement sug-
gested that plaintiff sought to recover for personal injury. The result in this Letter Ruling,
like the result in Hodge, is questionable. The Service appears to focus primarily on the
results of the sex discrimination, i.e., reduced compensation, rather than on the fact that
discrimination occurred.
The Service reached a similar result in Private Letter Ruling 8836034 (June 14, 1988).
There the taxpayer filed a complaint with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission claiming that
his former employer had eliminated his position in violation of state laws prohibiting age
discrimination. In addition, the taxpayer was preparing to file a federal action against his
former employer for violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 to 634 (1982). The former employer negotiated a lump sum settle-
ment with the taxpayer. Rejecting the application of Section 104(a)(2) to the settlement
award, the Service noted that both the Ohio statutory scheme and the federal Act cited
above were intended "to restore victims of age discrimination to the economic position they
would have occupied but for the employer's illegal conduct." The claims that the taxpayer
released against his former employer were therefore economic claims rather than claims for
personal injury. The Service also noted that while ADEA provides for liquidated damages
where there has been a willful violation, the liquidated damages were based on back pay and
therefore should be treated as nonexcludable under Section 104(a)(2). That conclusion by
the Service is inconsistent with the Tax Court's treatment of liquidated damages in
Thompson.
103. I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (1986).
104. 90 T.C. 1000.
105. 90 T.C. at 1004-05.
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compensate Byrne for personal injuries, the court had to consider
the nature of the EEOC claims. Because the claims were based on
an alleged violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act,'10 the court
considered whether such a violation was tort or tort-like. Byrne ar-
gued that the EEOC claims were similar to "personal injury torts"
under New Jersey law, "i.e. 'abusive, wrongful, and retaliatory dis-
charge and defamation of character.' " 07 Byrne relied on "the re-
cently developed New Jersey 'tort cause of action for employees
discharged in violation of public policy.'-,o
Although the court approved of Byrne's analogy to state law,
the court noted that the New Jersey court had acknowledged in
Pierce that such cases might also raise contract claims.'09 In other
words, a state contract analogy was equally possible. Furthermore,
the court noted that claims in addition to those under the Fair
Labor Standards Act, including state tort and contract claims,
might be covered by the broad language of the release executed by
Byrne.'"
Byrne argued that the EEOC's failure in its complaint to seek
back pay indicated that "no part of the settlement payment was
made to compensate for contractual damages, i.e., lost wages." 11'
The Tax Court also rejected this argument, emphasizing that the
language of the release was more probative of Grammer's intent in
making the settlement."' Given the breadth of the release lan-
guage, the court concluded that a range of claims, including claims
based on Byrne's employment contract, were resolved. Under these
circumstances, the court concluded that only part of the settle-
ment amount was excludable under Section 104(a)(2)." 3
Byrne thus provides an excellent example of the difficulties
courts confront in attempting to determine whether a personal in-
jury has occurred. Given the ongoing development of state contract
and tort theories and the merger of those theories in certain cases,
the Tax Court and other federal courts will continually find them-
selves analyzing state law and attempting to determine whether an
action is more analogous to a tort action than to a contract action.
106. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, § 15(a)(3), 52 Stat. 1068 (current version at 29
U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1982)).
107. 90 T.C. at 1008.
108. Id. at 1008-09 (citing Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d
505 (1980)).
109. Id. at 1009.
110. Id. at 1010.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1011.
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As in Byrne, no clear determination may be possible.
The attempt by the Tax Court in Byrne and Thompson to
allocate an award between personal injury claims and contract
claims is equally problematic. In each instance, the employer took
action against the employee which was deemed to cause personal
injury to the employee. The Tax Court, however, seems to say that
if the injury can be viewed as either a contract injury or a personal
injury, then there must be some bifurcation of the award or settle-
ment for purposes of applying Section 104(a)(2). That is not a rea-
sonable standard. Arguably, Byrne would have recovered $20,000
under either theory. The reliance of the Tax Court on the general
nature of the release does not resolve the problem. Releases are
always general. A better rule in a case like Byrne would be that if
the injury can be characterized as a "personal injury," then any
damages received, including damages for alleged contract viola-
tions, should be excluded.
B. Taxpayer Efforts to Characterize Payments as "Damages on
Account of Personal Injury"
As illustrated by Byrne, the majority of reported Section
104(a)(2) decisions reflect taxpayers' efforts to characterize awards
or settlements which they have received as compensation for injury
to their personal reputations. In the earliest of such post-Glenshaw
Glass cases, Agar v. Commissioner,114 the taxpayer was unsuccess-
ful in his effort to exclude amounts received from his employer
upon his resignation from the company. While there was evidence
that the taxpayer had resigned because of accusations and criti-
cism levelled against him, the settlement agreement made no refer-
ence to these matters, and indicated only that the taxpayer was
leaving his employment because of a desire to return to public ac-
counting. Furthermore, the record reflected that the employer in-
tended its payments to the taxpayer to be a form of severance pay
rather than a settlement for any possible defamation claims which
the taxpayer may have had." 5
The Tax Court subsequently encountered a similar defama-
tion argument in Knuckles v. Commissioner."6 There the tax-
114. 290 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1961), aff'g T.C. Memo 1960-21.
115. 290 F.2d at 284. In addition, the Tax Court opinion noted that even assuming
that the taxpayer had established that the amounts received were in compensation for the
injury he suffered as a result of the accusations and criticism, the amounts would still not be
excludable because the injury complained of would have been one to his business reputation
and not one to his personal reputation. T.C. Memo 1960-21.
116. T.C. Memo 1964-33, aff'd 349 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1965).
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payer, an employee of a life insurance company, was fired for alleg-
edly mismanaging the company. The taxpayer sued to recover for
breach of contract. Only after a settlement had been reached as to
the amount of damages did the taxpayer introduce a theory of re-
covery based on personal injury, specifically, injury to his personal
reputation and his health. The company, however, refused to ac-
knowledge any tort liability or any liability whatsoever. On the ba-
sis of these facts, the Tax Court held and the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals agreed that the amount received by the taxpayer was
intended only as compensation for breach of contract. As such, the
settlement was not excludable.
Undaunted by the taxpayers' failures in Agar and Knuckles,
Southern Illinois University faculty members whose positions were
cut as a result of budget reductions sought to exclude settlements
they received from the University by characterizing them as
amounts received on account of personal injuries including defa-
mation. " In rejecting the faculty members' exclusion arguments,
the Tax Court noted that the faculty members failed to establish
that the University, in making the settlement payments, intended
to compensate the faculty members for possible defamation or
other personal injury claims which the faculty members might
have pursued. The University's settlement guidelines did not indi-
cate that the settlements were intended to compensate faculty
members for "tort or tort type" damages but rather merely pro-
vided that each faculty member whose position was terminated
was to receive one year's salary." 8
The taxpayer in Seay v. Commissioner,'1 9 however, was suc-
cessful in convincing the Tax Court that part of a settlement he
received from his former employer constituted compensation for
injury to his personal reputation. In Seay, the taxpayer's position
as president of a corporation was terminated when a dispute arose
between the taxpayer and the owners of the corporation. The tax-
payer refused to vacate his position and the owners of the corpora-
tion instituted a trespass action against him which received wide
publicity. Personally embarrassed by the publicity, the taxpayer
believed that his personal reputation had been damaged. A settle-
ment reached between the taxpayer and the owners provided for
the payment to the taxpayer of one year's salary plus $45,000 for
any damages caused by the newspaper publicity. A letter agree-
ment specifically stated that the $45,000 was "compensation for
117. Whitehead v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1980-508.
118. Id.
119. 58 T.C. 32 (1972).
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such personal embarrassment, mental and physical strain and in-
jury to health and personal reputation in the community" the tax-
payer had suffered.1 20 Emphasizing that the nature of the claim
settled is determinative for Section 104(a)(2) purposes, the Tax
Court concluded that the evidence indicated the payor paid
$45,000 to the taxpayer to compensate him for any personal inju-
ries suffered.121 Therefore, the $45,000 was excludable by the tax-
payer under Section 104(a)(2).
Recently, in Madson v. Commissioner,12 2 the taxpayer suc-
ceeded in arguing for the exclusion of the entire amount he re-
ceived in settlement of his action against the City of Green Bay,
Wisconsin for forcing him to retire as police chief at age sixty. Fol-
lowing a trial on the merits, the state court determined that Green
Bay had violated the taxpayer's right to equal protection and had
also breached its employment contract with the taxpayer. The
court awarded the taxpayer damages computed with reference to
his lost earnings and loss of state retirement and social security
benefits. The court also concluded that the amount of damages
awarded to the taxpayer would have been the same under either
the contract or equal protection theory of recovery. 123 Green Bay
appealed the trial court decision. During the appeal the parties
agreed to settle the dispute for $41,000. While the settlement
agreement was silent regarding the reason for the payment, the
Tax Court concluded that the payment was for the violation of the
taxpayer's equal protection rights. The Tax Court reasoned that
because Green Bay relied on its insurer to pay the $41,000 and
because the insurer was not obligated to pay for breach of contract,
Green Bay must have intended to pay the taxpayer for the viola-
tion of taxpayer's equal protection rights, a tort type claim. Exclu-
sion was therefore appropriate.12 4
These employment-dispute cases, combined with the recent
decisions in Byrne, Thompson, Metzger, and Bent, reflect the
post-Glenshaw Glass pattern of taxpayers' constant and some-
times creative efforts to bring their settlements or awards within
the scope of Section 104(a)(2) or, as in Agar, the Hawkins exclu-
sion.12 5 In addition, they emphasize the failure of the courts since
120. Id. at 35.
121. Id. at 37.
122. T.C. Memo 1988-325.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. In Private Letter Ruling 8829016 (April 15, 1988) the Service considered whether
Section 104(a)(2) was applicable to amounts received by taxpayers in settlement of a suit
brought against a brokerage firm for its involvement in an investment fraud in which the
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Glenshaw Glass to reconsider whether amounts received for non-
physical personal injuries such as defamation or violation of civil
rights should be excluded from gross income. Nor is there any ef-
fort to develop a consistent and reasoned policy which would at
least limit the extent to which taxpayers could exclude employ-
ment awards and settlements from gross income. Rather, the
courts, and even the Service, have seemed content to accept that if
an employee could establish that amounts paid him by his em-
ployer were intended to settle any potential claims that the em-
ployee had against the employer for injury to the employee's per-
sonal reputation or civil rights, then the employee could exclude
the amount from gross income. Having uncritically adopted that
position, the courts' analysis in these cases is necessarily limited to
a sterile examination of the pleadings and the settlement agree-
ment to determine whether the taxpayer-employee proved his case.
The taxpayers in Agar, Knuckles, and other cases would presuma-
bly have been entitled to exclude all or part of the settlements
they received from their employers had they simply done a better
job in either pleading their action or in drafting their settlement
agreements. The case law is disturbing in its emphasis on pleading
and on drafting the settlement agreements and releases. The case
law is even more troubling, however, in its failure to address the
threshold issue of permitting an exclusion for nonphysical personal
injury awards.
IV. CONCLUSION: A POLICY BASED LIMITATION FOR SECTION 104
(a)(2)
The early history of the tax treatment of damages strongly
suggests that the original statutory exclusion was based on return-
taxpayers lost a large sum of money. In their complaint, the taxpayers alleged:
[V]iolations of federal and state securities laws, federal commodity trading laws,
federal and state racketeering laws, mail-fraud, wire-fraud, common law fraud and
breach of fiduciary duty. In addition, the [taxpayers] claimed that the enormous
monetary losses suffered in connection with the investment was [sic] the proxi-
mate cause of severe emotional distress.
The taxpayers did not, however, elaborate on the extent of personal injuries suffered or
request damages for personal injury. The settlement documents indicated that all claims,
including personal injury claims, were being settled, but made no allocation of the settle-
ment amount to personal injury claims. Rather, the taxpayers were advised by their attor-
neys that they could make whatever allocation they believed proper. The taxpayers allo-
cated a significant amount of the settlement to their personal injury claims. The Service
rejected the applicability of Section 104(a)(2) noting that there was no indication that the
brokerage firm intended to compensate the taxpayers for personal injury. Citing Agar, the
Service emphasized that the intention of the payor was important in determining the nature
of the damage award. The Letter Ruling provides yet another example of the importance of
pleadings and the language of settlement agreements.
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of-capital notions that had been formulated primarily in considera-
tion of proceeds received for accidental physical injuries. This the-
oretical foundation was not carefully considered after the enact-
ment of the statute, because of the emerging definition of
"income." During the reign of Eisner v. Macomber, the Service
and the courts agreed that damages received on account of per-
sonal injury simply did not constitute income; the statutory exclu-
sion, in effect, was superfluous. Under the influence of the narrow
definition of income, the Service reasoned that damages for non-
physical injuries were nontaxable. The Tax Court decision in Haw-
kins v. Commissioner applied that reasoning to such injuries in the
employment context where, as detailed previously, the statutory
exclusion today has growing significance.
Following the rejection of the Eisner v. Macomber definition
of income in Glenshaw Glass, the Hawkins line of authority should
have been similarly rejected, leaving only the original statutory re-
turn-of-capital concept as the basis for exclusion. Instead, the Ser-
vice and courts failed to reconsider Hawkins and its progeny and
uncritically merged the Hawkins line of authority and return-of-
capital concept into post-Glenshaw Glass Section 104(a)(2) cases.
Given the history of Section 104(a)(2), only the return-of-capi-
tal concept should have any validity today, and even that concept
suffers from severe limitations. Under traditional tax principles,
application of the return-of-capital theory requires that the tax-
payer establish an investment of capital in the asset in question,
recognized by the tax code as basis. In the case of a person's corpo-
ral and noncorporal attributes-one's body, reputation, mental
health, and the like-one presumes that the tax code, ordinarily at
least, recognizes no investment of capital, and so no basis. Perhaps
money spent over time on food, clothing, shelter, and education, as
well as other expenditures necessary for survival or development,
might arguably provide a tax basis in one's body and personal
rights or attributes. The code, however, has never acknowledged
such an investment as constituting basis, and the practical and ad-
ministrative difficulties inherent in doing so in the general case
seem insurmountable. It seems clear that a taxpayer realizes gain
on receipt of a personal injury award.12
126. Of course, one may conjure up circumstances in which considerations of equity
might argue that a specific nondeductible expense has given the taxpayer a basis in some
bodily part or personal attribute. But this is surely the aberration, not the norm, and even
in the aberrational case, the basis is neither infinite nor elastic; it would have to be estab-
lished by the taxpayer, not presumed to encompass whatever award is rendered. Assume, for
example, that a taxpayer incurs nondeductible expenses for elective cosmetic surgery. If the
taxpayer thereafter sustains disfiguring injuries, which essentially undo the cosmetic sur-
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If the receipt of a personal injury award constitutes realization
of gain-which, by traditional tax standards, it must-the exclu-
sion of the gain from income can be justified only by substantial
policy considerations. One might presume that the involuntariness
of the injury sustained is a factor underlying the exclusion, for the
taxpayer who consents in advance to the "injury" apparently
removes the compensation received from the protection of Section
104(a)(2).2 Commentators and courts have suggested that per-
sonal injury awards are excluded for humanitarian reasons. One
writer states that taxing the compensation received "by persons
who have been blinded or crippled by accident would no doubt be
regarded as heartless, unless their recoveries from tortfeasors were
correspondingly increased," but notes that the exclusion extends to
"less emotionally charged receipts" as well. 12 8 Indeed, the Ninth
Circuit has suggested that the Commissioner's willingness to ex-
clude personal injury lump-sum awards in their entirety was based
on "a feeling that the injured party, who has suffered enough,
should not be further burdened with the practical difficulty of sort-
ing out the taxable and nontaxable components."' 9
But if humanitarian concerns underlie the exclusion of dam-
ages from income, the obvious objection is that not all damages on
account of involuntary personal injuries-and perhaps relatively
few-warrant such tender treatment. It may, for example, be
"heartless" to tax damage awards received on account of severe
physical injuries, such as brain damage, paralysis, loss of sight or
numerous other terrible injuries. But few conceivable humanita-
rian reasons exist to exclude damages received for a sprained ankle
or a bruised arm; for defamation of personal or business reputa-
tion; for violation of free speech rights; for violation of open meet-
ing laws; or for all manner of claims that can plausibly be shoe-
horned into a personal injury mold. Moreover, why is it only the
compensated victim to whom humanitarian tax relief is extended?
The uncompensated victim is presumably even more deserving of
compassion, and surely administrative burdens could be satisfacto-
rily taken into account in fashioning some tax relief program-an
gery, and for which damages are awarded, it may not seriously offend one's tax principles to
exclude the damages from income to the extent of the nondeductible expenses, or at least to
the extent of some prorated ("unused") portion thereof. Of course, if one spies a slippery
slope in the vicinity of this example, all bets are off.
127. See, e.g., United States v. Garber, 589 F.2d 843 (5th Cir. 1979).
128. B. BITTKER, 1 FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFrs 13-2 (1982).
129. Roemer, 716 F.2d at 696. Subsequently, the Service issued Revenue Ruling 85-97,
which explicitly confirms that the lost wages component of a personal injury award is not
taxable. Rev. Rul. 85-97, 1985-2 C.B. 50.
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allowance of certain personal injury losses, perhaps-for the un-
compensated. The conclusion one is finally driven to is that hu-
manitarian reasons supply a woefully inadequate justification for
the breadth of injuries encompassed by Section 104(a)(2).
Of course, in some instances there may be other strong social
policy reasons advanced to justify use of the tax code to encourage
the victim of injury to pursue and, through the legal system, penal-
ize the tortfeasor. Racial discrimination, for example, might be
deemed so abhorrent that some might argue that private action
against it ought to receive tax-favored treatment. Nonetheless,
Section 104(a)(2) is scarcely limited to personal injuries that strike
at a society's fundamental values, nor have the pro-taxpayer re-
sults in discrimination cases been justified in those terms. In sum,
it seems clear that no policy justifies the breadth of the existing
exclusion. Accordingly, it is not surprising that courts, faced with
the broad language of Section 104(a)(2) and the absence of any
policy moorings, have been willing to permit exclusion to an ever-
expanding array of personal injury awards. But the exclusions grow
increasingly problematic as Section 104(a)(2) encompasses more
and more employment-related awards where traditional tax analy-
sis would lead to the conclusion that taxable compensation was
paid.
May the compensation element in such awards be identified
and taxed? First, consider the position and role of the courts. As
noted, the language of the Section 104(a)(2) is broad; the exclusion
extends literally to "any damages received on account of personal
injury." Given the return-of-capital concept that prompted enact-
ment of the original statute, it might be argued that the exclusion
should apply only where the taxpayer can identify some property
interest that has been damaged and is being restored by the award.
Such an approach, for example, would clearly eliminate any exclu-
sion for lost wages and punitive damages, and perhaps for pain and
suffering as well. But the return-of-capital concept was flawed to
begin with. Why overturn settled law in favor of a fundamentally
unworkable concept?
Alternatively, the courts might seek to limit the exclusion to
physical injuries, consistent with the probable intention of the
drafters of the original statute.130 Such an approach rewrites a stat-
ute that Congress has clearly chosen to leave as is. It also draws a
line that may frequently be difficult to justify, but it is a line that
130. See text accompanying footnotes 11 and 12.
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Congress has chosen to draw in Section 130.131 Congress's treat-
ment of Section 130 is all the more reason to insist that such line-
drawing in Section 104(a)(2) be done only by Congress. As a half-
way measure, the statutory language might be interpreted so as to
exclude, as damages "on account of" personal injury, those dam-
ages that rest on employment-based factors such as the victim's
occupation or salary level. The Service has made an analogous ar-
gument with respect to damages based on the tortfeasor's malice or
recklessness, and its belated efforts to subject punitive damages to
taxation might yet be rewarded with success. But, the Service has
conceded the exclusion with respect to lost wages. Urging the Ser-
vice or the courts to rethink the treatment of employment-related
awards simply comes too late in the day. The courts cannot create
the policy that Congress failed to provide, nor revive and reexam-
ine long-settled concepts the Congress has not challenged. It is for
Congress to establish tax policy, and thus it is Congress that must
address the burgeoning of the Section 104(a)(2) exclusion." 2
The Code is replete with provisions that carve out exceptions
to general tax rules. There would likely be little quarrel with a
Congressional decision to exclude from income for humanitarian
reasons a limited category of personal injury awards. 133 Whether
such awards were also employment-related would then become less
significant, and also, given the nature of the limited excludable-
injury categories that might be drawn, less likely to occur and less
131. Congress has limited the special exclusion available to structured settlement com-
panies (i.e., third parties who assume the obligation to pay damages owed by another) to
obligations involving payment of damages on account of physical injury or sickness. I.R.C. §
130(c).
132. A number of articles have examined the Section 104(a)(2) exclusion in recent
years. See, for example: Morgan, Old Torts, New Torts and Taxes: The Still Uncertain
Scope of Section 104(a)(2), 48 LA. L. REV. 875 (1988); Cochran, Should Personal Injury
Damage Awards Be Taxed?, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 43 (1987); Morris, Taxing Economic
Loss Recovered In Personal Injury Actions: Toward a Capital Idea?, 38 U. FLA. L. REv. 735
(1986); Frolik, Personal Injury Compensation As a Tax Preference, 37 ME. L. REV. 1 (1985);
Morrison, Getting a Rule Right and Writing a Wrong Rule: The IRS Demands a Return on
All Punitive Damages, 17 CONN. L. REV. 39 (1984).
133. Even among its related provisions in Sections 104 and 105, Section 104(a)(2) is
noteworthy in its breadth. Section 104(a)(1) is limited to workers' compensation awards.
Section 104(a)(3) excludes employee-financed accident or health insurance. Exclusions
under Section 105 for employer-financed insurance are limited to medical expenses incurred
by the employee and to certain permanent disability or disfigurement payments. Whatever
the merits of such exclusions-and they are admittedly debatable-embedding them in the
context of workers' compensation, or accident or health insurance, surely restrains their ex-
pansion and the ease with which they may be manipulated. Section 104(a)(4), as limited by
Section 104(b), and Section 104(a)(5) provide exclusions only for certain military disability




disruptive to general tax principles. Any special treatment pro-
vided must be seen as equitable, must be administratively feasible,
and must be drafted so that clear guidance is given to taxpayers
and the Service as to the specific circumstances that give rise to
the favored treatment. The design of the special provisions should
also hew as closely as possible to general tax principles underlying
the income tax code. For example, increased personal exemptions
could be granted to persons with objectively verifiable disabilities;
the exemption could vary depending on the degree of disability,
and could be phased out beyond certain income levels. Consistent
with existing preferences for the blind and elderly, such an ap-
proach would have the further advantage of treating disabled per-
sons equally for tax purposes, regardless of the cause of the disabil-
ity (tortious injury, birth defect, etc.) and regardless of whether
compensation had been received for the disability. Under such an
approach, all recoveries for personal injuries would be taxable, ex-
cept reimbursement of nondeductible medical expenses. As an al-
ternative approach, the lost wages component of a damage award
could be specifically subject to tax, along with any amount of puni-
tive damages awarded. Such an approach would be consistent with
the general tax principle that substitutes for ordinary income shall
be taxed as ordinary income, and also with the Glenshaw Glass
view of income. Where an award compensated for lost wages over a
number of years, an income-averaging rule could be adopted to
mitigate the bunching effect. As another alternative, an exclusion
could be patterned on Section 105(c) and limited to what are pre-
sumably the most serious injuries-those that cause permanent
disability or disfigurement.
The final suggestion might offer the most promise of a policy-
based tax treatment of damages for personal injuries or sickness.
The fundamental difficulty with Section 104(a)(2) is that it is not
grounded in any sound tax policy. One solution would be to simply
eliminate Section 104(a)(2), so that all such damages are taxed in
full, as ordinary income in the year received. Such a solution may
lack political appeal; it definitely lacks consistency with companion
provisions in Section 104 and 105. The major problems with Sec-
tion 104(a)(2) can successfully be addressed by narrowing its scope
in a manner generally consistent with Sections 104 and 105. The
Section 104(a)(2) exclusion for personal injuries or sickness should
be no greater than that provided by other provisions of Section 104
and Section 105. Section 104(a)(3) and Section 105 distinguish be-
tween the tax treatment of proceeds of health and accident insur-
ance based on whether the insurance is employer-provided or em-
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ployee-provided. As between the two, the damages received by a
tort victim may be better analogized to employer-provided insur-
ance, since in both instances the recipient has no after-tax "invest-
ment" attributable to the amounts received. If the analogy is ac-
cepted, then consistent with Section 104(a)(3) and 105, the
damages received under Section 104(a)(2) should be includable in
income-except to the extent they are attributable to amounts ex-
pended for medical care in a manner similar to Section 105(b), and
except to the extent they are attributable to permanent disability
or disfigurement in a manner similar to Section 105(c). Such an
approach would end the exclusion for non-physical injuries and for
physical injuries that are not serious ones, yet would maintain a
compassionate response for recoveries on account of the most seri-
ous physical injuries. It remains true, of course, that Section
104(a)(1) would continue to exclude amounts received under work-
ers' compensation acts without limitations such as those contained
in Section 105, and workers' compensation may be viewed as em-
ployer-provided insurance. Nonetheless, the tax treatment of work-
ers' compensation may reflect its historic concern for employment
conditions in or related to the workplace, and the favorable tax
treatment is circumscribed by the requirement that compensation
be under a workers' compensation act. Whether the distinction
warrants different tax treatment may be debatable, but the dis-
tinction itself is apparent. The Section 104(a)(2) exclusion may
thus be limited in a fashion consistent with Section 104(a)(3) and
Section 105, and as a result may achieve a consistency, rationality,
and policy basis that it sorely lacks now.
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